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Liability for Unconscious Discrimination?
A Thought Experiment in the Theory of
Employment Discrimination Law
Patrick S. Shin
Recent scholarship in employment discrimination law has wrestled with the problem of
unconscious bias and its implications for antidiscrimination law. This Article addresses
what some might regard as a naïve question: Should actions influenced by unconscious
bias be regarded as discrimination under Title VII? The question might be considered
naïve because any proposal for liability based on unconscious bias would surely be
unripe for present implementation, and because there is no accepted method either for
detecting such bias in individual cases, or for determining whether such bias actually
influenced a person’s decisionmaking. But these practical considerations provide no
answer to the fundamental issue that underlies the question. Does unconsciously biased
action fall within the legal concept of actionable discrimination? To reach that
important issue, I devise a thought experiment that brackets practical problems of
proof and squarely raises what I regard as the hard question for theorizing about
unconscious discrimination. Should an employment action give rise to liability when
that action was provably affected by the actor’s unconscious bias with respect to a
statutorily protected classification, even when the actor consciously acted only on
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons? The payoff of the thought experiment is not
only a clearer picture of the theoretical commitments entailed by liability based on
unconscious bias, but also a keener understanding of our currently prevailing notions
of actionable discrimination.

 Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School; J.D., Harvard Law School; Ph.D.,
Philosophy, Harvard University. I owe thanks to Larry Alexander, Frank Cooper, Mitu Gulati, Bernie
Jones, Kim Krawiec, Helen Norton, Andy Perlman, Gowri Ramachandran, Al Roberts, Sam
Sommers, and Bob Smith for their helpful questions and suggestions, and also to Casey Lyons and
Alyssa Minsky for their excellent research assistance.
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Introduction
A steadily mounting body of social science research provides strong
evidence that our intentional actions are often influenced by
psychological factors that are not present to our introspective
1
awareness—for example, “implicit” or unconscious biases. One direct
implication of this research is that ascertaining a person’s conscious
1. For a review of the literature, see Katherine Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The
Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1893, 1904–
20 (2009), and Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 945 (2006).
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motives for an action may not always provide a complete explanation of
why she did it. The most comprehensive explanation of an action might
require positing the influence of a psychological factor that played no
part in the actor’s conscious deliberations. Thus, an actor’s decision to
take a particular adverse action against one individual rather than
another might be best understood as having been affected by the actor’s
awareness of the race of those individuals, even if the actor could
sincerely disavow any conscious consideration of race as a reason for the
decision.
The possibility of this sort of scenario—cases in which an
objectionable bias affects an action without entering the actor’s own
awareness—presents a worrisome impediment to the achievement of
justice in the workplace. There have been numerous deeply insightful
articles describing the problem of implicit bias and discussing its
2
implications for antidiscrimination law. My purpose in this Article is to
focus directly on what might be called a naïve question of liability: should
3
implicit bias be a basis of disparate treatment liability under Title VII?
The question might fairly be regarded as naïve insofar as any proposal
for such liability would surely be unripe for present implementation in
light of serious issues pertaining to problems of proof in individual cases,
not to mention intramural disputes among experts about the proper
practical inferences that can be drawn from studies of implicit bias. My
interest, however, is more fundamental. I want to understand whether
and how the notion of unconsciously biased action should figure into our
current legal conception of actionable discrimination. This is a
4
thoroughly normative, not a scientific or epistemological, question.
The question of this Article, then, is whether employment actions
causally affected by implicit bias should ipso facto be regarded as

2. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination
Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 5–7 (2006); Bartlett, supra note 1; Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in
Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 91 (2003); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Calif. L. Rev.
969 (2006); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
“Affirmative Action,” 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1063 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity,
47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995); Ann C. McGinley, ¡Viva la Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive
in Title VII, 9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 415 (2000); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent
Discrimination, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 899 (1993); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458 (2001); Amy L. Wax, Discrimination
as Accident, 74 Ind. L.J. 1129 (1999).
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
4. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias, “Science,” and Antidiscrimination Law, 1 Harv. L. &
Pol’y Rev. 477, 491 (2007) (“Science does not defeat the implicit bias law-reform program, but science
does not establish the case for that program, either. That program depends on a normative judgment
that discrimination is not about fault but about a social problem—a normative judgment that is deeply
contested among judges and policymakers.”).
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actionably discriminatory, even when the actor genuinely and reasonably
believed that the action was justified by nondiscriminatory
considerations. Part of what is really at stake in the question of liability
for unconsciously biased action is an implicit judgment about the relative
priority that should be given to the sufficiency of an agent’s nonpretextual rationale for the action, versus socio-psychological
explanations that deemphasize the importance of that deliberative
perspective and focus instead on the action’s causal etiology. I argue that
the most significant conceptual shift entailed by liability for truly
“unconscious discrimination” is not the shift from a fault-based to a
consequence-based standard of liability (the shift on which others have
5
focused), but from an agent-relative, justificatory conception to what
might be described as a diagnostic, causally-oriented understanding of
what constitutes discriminatory action. I contend that this shift would
represent a significant departure from, rather than an incremental
expansion of, current conceptions of discrimination, and I discuss
concerns about whether a causal conception of discrimination might
diminish the moral significance of the charge of discrimination and
whether it may create a deep instability for any distinction between
individual discriminatory action and “societal” discrimination.

II. Isolating the Hard Question
The question whether employment discrimination laws should allow
for liability on a theory of implicit bias is, in a sense, purely academic. It
is not clear that practicable, scientifically accepted methods for proving
that a particular individual harbors implicit bias, or for establishing that
any particular action in non-laboratory conditions was affected by such
6
bias, currently exist. This is not to deny the convincing evidence of
implicit bias (although it is not entirely uncontroversial to claim that
measures of implicit bias, like the Harvard Implicit Association Test
7
8
(IAT), are actually predictive of any real-world action). But it is one
5. See id.
6. See Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 979, 981–86
(2008).
7. See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 6 (describing the test).
8. For analysis in support of the predictive value of the IAT, see Anthony G. Greenwald et al.,
Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 17 (2009). For a study that raises some critical questions, see Andrew
Karpinksi & James L. Hilton, Attitudes and the Implicit Association Test, 81 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 774 (2001). For an overtly skeptical perspective, see Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. Tetlock,
Attributions of Implicit Prejudice, or “Would Jesse Jackson ‘Fail’ the Implicit Association Test?,” 15
Psychol. Inquiry 257, 264, 270 (2004) (objecting to reaction time data on implicit bias on the grounds
that it may reflect cultural stereotypes instead of prejudice, negative responses may be due to
emotions unrelated to prejudice, and that sometimes data showing prejudice can also show rational
behavior), and Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 1023, 1023 (2006) (arguing that research on implicit bias needs to
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thing to accept the research that supports the hypothesis that people act
from biases of which they are not consciously aware; it is arguably quite
another to adduce proof sufficient to establish that unconscious bias
affected a specific act of decisionmaking in the complex setting of the
9
workplace, even in the face of the actor’s genuine disavowals.
Thus, it would not be unfair to take the position that the question
whether the employment discrimination laws should allow for liability
based on proof of implicit bias is unripe for practical and meaningful
10
discussion at present. This difficulty would seem to counsel strongly in
favor of reform proposals that address the problem of implicit bias
without trying to make it a basis for liability under Title VII or other
11
antidiscrimination statutes. For example, in their well-known article,
Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji argue that implicit bias research
provides a basis for the use of affirmative action as a way to introduce
12
“debiasing” agents into the workplace, but they are careful to disclaim
13
any argument for outright liability.
More generally, the current impracticability of a liability scheme
premised on implicit bias might be thought to obviate any inquiry about
whether such liability could be justified. But I think that is the wrong
conclusion to draw. In fact, the concern about the unripeness of the
question of liability implies a distinction between the practical and the
theoretical question. The point of the concern is that the practical
difficulties provide reason to put off addressing the theoretical issue of
liability. The concern implicitly acknowledges the existence of a further
question, masked by problems of scientific validity, evidentiary proof,
14
and doctrinal implementation. What I want to do is to bracket those

include a more “rigorous investigation of . . . error rates,” an analysis of the predictive utility of
measuring implicit bias in the workplace, and a discussion of social consequences of changing
requirements for proving bias). See generally Bruce Bower, The Bias Finders, 169 Sci. News 250 (2006)
(reporting disagreement among psychologists about what exactly can be inferred from IAT findings).
9. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 997, 1034–36 (2006).
10. Cf. Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 Ala. L.
Rev. 741, 774–77 (2005) (discussing practical difficulties); Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 8, at 1067–70
(asserting the claimed link between unconscious discrimination and discriminatory behavior have
“little legal significance”); Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Discrimination:
Firm-Based Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 Del. J. Corp. L. 347, 421 (2008) (observing
practical challenges to solutions proposed by scholars).
11. For examples of such proposals, see Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological
Research Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional
Discrimination, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 83, 108–28 (2008) (suggesting procedural litigation reforms to help
account for implicit bias), Green, supra note 2, at 144–56 (calling for “structural” workplace reform as
a response to the problem of implicit bias), and Sturm, supra note 2, at 479–522, 553–61 (same).
12. Kang & Banaji, supra note 2, at 1108–15.
13. Id. at 1077 (“We are not arguing that implicit bias-induced discrimination should produce the same
legal liability as explicit animus-driven discrimination under current . . . federal antidiscrimination statutes.”).
14. Cf. Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 492 (arguing that some forms of skepticism about the legal
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practical difficulties in order to reach the normative issue of whether the
employment discrimination laws should be understood to encompass
liability for actions tainted by unconscious bias.
A. Two Assumptions
To that end, I am going to assume the truth of some controversial
hypotheses. In doing so, I do not mean to dismiss disagreement about
them as unimportant or illusory. The purpose of these assumptions is to
isolate and expose the central normative questions about how the law
should regard actions affected by implicit bias. My intent is to
disentangle my arguments from debates that can only play out in the
social scientific realm. The payoff of this discussion, I hope, will be not
only a clearer picture of the theoretical commitments entailed by liability
based on unconscious bias, but a keener understanding of our currently
prevailing notion of actionable discrimination.
1. The First Assumption
The first controversial hypothesis that I am going to assume to be
true is that unconscious or implicit bias is real. To avoid any
misunderstanding about exactly what this assumption is supposed to
15
mean, I shall take some time to explain. At a minimum, the assumption
implies that people can have psychological states or dispositions of which
16
they are not conscious, including unconscious dispositions affecting
17
actual behavior. I take this to entail that it is possible for a true and
accurate description of a person’s psychological dispositions to include
preferences or other proclivities of which the person is unaware and is
18
unable to make himself aware. It also means that it is possible for a
implications of implicit bias research are really normative arguments about the scope of actionable
discrimination, and therefore calling for “a renewed attention to antidiscrimination theory”).
15. For an expansive and insightful examination of the meaning of “unconscious” and the
question whether the unconscious “exists,” see Michael S. Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking
the Relationship 126–47, 249–80 (1984).
16. I do not venture any claim about the metaphysics of psychological or mental states, and I
daresay my discussion does not depend on any particular thesis about the nature of the relation
between mental states and physical brain states.
17. Here, again, I wish to avoid any entanglement in philosophical debates about the metaphysics
of mental causation. I hope it will suffice to stipulate that I am taking a broadly functionalist approach
to the nature of mental states—an approach under which we can understand mental or psychological
states in terms of their functional roles in thought and behavior, independent of any underlying thesis
about how such states might be realized in or reduced to physical brain states. See Moore, supra note
15, at 35.
18. I add “unable to make himself aware” to distinguish mental states of which a person might
not presently be conscious, but of which the person could become aware if she made an effort to direct
her attention to them. This sort of temporarily latent mental state, for example, a suppressed state of
hunger, is not unconscious in the sense that makes implicit bias problematic. Cf. id. at 130 (using the
Freudian term “preconscious” to refer to this simple sense of “unconscious”). In the sense of
unconscious that is relevant to the problem of implicit bias, to say that we had certain unconscious
mental states means that “we are not able to recall them at all, even if we do direct considerable
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person to act from a particular disposition without being aware, and
without being able to become aware, that she has acted from that
19
disposition.
The assumption that implicit bias is “real” implies, more specifically,
that a person can have an unconscious psychological disposition that
comprises or results in a bias toward certain types of individuals as
compared to others. That is, a person can have an unconscious
psychological state that comprises or results in a disposition to act more
favorably toward individuals with certain characteristics than individuals
without those characteristics—which is to say that those characteristics
can influence that person’s actions such that she would act differently in
the absence of that influence. Finally, and crucially, the assumption
implies that a person may act from this kind of unconscious disposition
even when she could genuinely disavow consideration of the disposing
20
characteristic. In other words, the person’s action might be influenced
21
by that characteristic without the actor being aware of that influence.
I will use the term “unconscious discrimination” to refer to this sort
of hypothesized case—in other words, where an agent acts from an
unconscious bias inaccessible to her own awareness—and in which the
disposing characteristic at issue is one that is a statutorily forbidden basis
for employment action (race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,
22
disability). The assumption that implicit bias is real means, therefore,
that unconscious discrimination is possible.
To make this more concrete, consider the example of unconscious
discrimination on account of race. What does it mean to say that racebased implicit bias is “real” and that unconscious discrimination because
of race is possible? What I take this to mean is that some people have
unconscious biases that dispose them to act more favorably to members
of certain races than to members of others, and, furthermore, that these
23
unconscious racial biases sometimes actually affect how people act.

attention to the question of what they were.” Id. at 131.
19. Michael Moore suggests, in a similar vein, that one thing that we might mean when we say
that a person has a particular “unconscious mental state” is “that the holder of the mental state does
not have the capacity to recognize the state that he is in; he cannot describe it even if he attempts to
direct his attention to it.” Id. at 129.
20. For a discussion of empirical support for this possibility, see David L. Faigman et al., A Matter
of Fit: The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 Hastings L.J. 1389, 1404–06
(2008) (“[S]elf-generated explanations of one’s own thought processes are often no more accurate
than that of outside observers who have little knowledge of the mental content of another person.”).
21. For a concise overview of the social science research providing evidence of the prevalence of
this sort of “dissociation” between self-professed attitudes and behavior, see Gary Blasi, Default
Discrimination: Law, Science, and Unintended Discrimination in the New Workplace, in 3 NYU
Selected Essays on Labor and Employment Law: Behavioral Analyses of Workplace
Discrimination 3, 6–12 (Mitu Gulati & Michael J. Yelnosky eds., 2007).
22. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
23. Michael Selmi has noted that the term “unconscious discrimination” is vague and could
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What does it mean for an unconscious racial bias to actually affect how a
person acts? The most straightforward case would be an agent taking an
action with respect to an individual of a particular race that the agent
would not have taken if only the individual was of a different race—thus
constituting bias. Yet, an honest report by the agent of the considerations
on which she believed she acted would not include the individual’s race
(this is the warrant for regarding the bias as unconscious).
The assumption that unconscious bias is real entails a claim about
the possible motivation of action generally. This claim is that an agent’s
actions are sometimes influenced by biases of which the agent is
unaware. If the claim is true, there seems little reason to doubt that
unconscious bias affects actions by decisionmakers in a wide variety of
24
contexts, including the workplace. From the perspective of employment
discrimination laws, the potential concern is evident. Employment
actions, no less than any other kind of action, might be influenced by
decision makers’ unconscious biases relating to race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, or disability—the considerations excluded from
25
permissible consideration under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in
26
Employment Act (ADEA), and Title I of the Americans with
27
Disabilities Act (ADA). The question that interests me is whether
actions that suffer from this sort of bias—acts of unconscious
discrimination—fit within the concept of actionable discrimination
embedded in these legal frameworks.
2. The Second Assumption
The second big assumption of this Article is that unconscious
discrimination is provable—in other words, that the influence of implicit
bias on an agent’s action is something that can, in principle, be proved in
28
individual cases. This assumption is presently probably closer to science
fiction than a plausible supposition, given what I understand to be the

potentially be used to refer to any kind of “subtle” discrimination not manifested in the form of overt
racism. See Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax: Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New
Bottle, 74 Ind. L.J. 1233, 1236 (1999). I am not using the term in this loose way, but rather to refer
specifically to differential treatment influenced by the psychological operation of implicit bias of which
the actor is unaware.
24. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of
Cognitive Science, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1587, 1603–05 (2006); Antony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll
Workers, Election Administration, and the Problem of Implicit Bias, 15 Mich. J. Race & L. 1, 21–33
(2009); Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective: Race of the Discretionary
Actors, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1811, 1818–19 (1998); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and Group
Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on Jury Deliberations, 90 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 597, 606–09 (2006).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006 & Supp. II).
28. To put it another way, I assume that the influencing effect of implicit bias on action is a
“datable event.”
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29

current state of the relevant sciences. Be that as it may, I am going to
suppose that it is, in principle, possible to detect or rule out the influence
of unconscious bias with respect to any given action by an individual
30
agent, the agent’s genuine disavowals notwithstanding. I will imagine,
more specifically, that it is in principle possible to determine whether, in
a given case, the agent’s unconscious bias was such that it caused the
agent to act differently than she would have in the absence of the bias. In
short, I am assuming that the truth of a claim that a particular action
constituted unconscious discrimination is something that can be
determined, on a preponderance of the evidence, through empirical
31
methods of proof.
This second assumption, much more than the first, will obviously
require a temporary suspension of practical skepticism. As I said at the
outset, the point of the assumption is not to deny or minimize the
possibility that it might in fact be false. It is, rather, to enable us to drill
down to the basic normative issue of liability that might otherwise be
clouded by worries about practical implementation.
B. A Hypothetical Test Case: “Work Experience”
I want to construct a hypothetical set of facts that puts my two
assumptions to work and provides us with a concrete case that squarely
presents what I have been characterizing as the basic normative issue of
liability for unconscious discrimination. I will refer to this scenario as the
“Work Experience” case.
An employer wants to hire someone for a managerial position. The
employer has to decide between two candidates. Both are qualified and

29. See Blasi, supra note 21, at 10–11; Wax, supra note 6, at 985–86.
30. If one likes, one might imagine that a battery of psychological tests and brain-imaging
techniques could be developed for this purpose. Cf. Blasi, supra note 21, at 10 (describing studies
linking perception of racial difference with certain patterns of brain activation).
31. On this assumption, unconscious bias is a discrete, detectable psychological phenomenon, as
opposed to a conceptual construct that merely stands in for the inexplicability of an action under more
intentional descriptions. The difference between these types of views is given some elaboration by
Alasdair MacIntyre in his discussion of Freud’s theory of the unconscious. See A.C. MacIntyre, The
Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis 50–79 (1958). As MacIntyre puts it, “Either the unconscious is
an inaccessible realm of inaccessible entities existing in its own right or it is a theoretical and
unobservable entity introduced to explain and relate a number of otherwise inexplicable phenomena.”
Id. at 71. In his discussion of MacIntyre’s view of Freud, Thomas D. D’Andrea nicely summarizes the
latter type of view of the unconscious in this way:
[T]he unconscious . . . represents simply an abductive inference to a better explanation of
the causes of certain forms of overt human behaviour. In positing an unconscious mind (or
unconscious processes at least) . . . Freud’s inference . . . conforms to a standard pattern of
scientific explanation: one which seeks to link observable to observable via an unobservable
process.
Thomas D. D’Andrea, Tradition, Rationality, and Virtue: The Thought of Alasdair MacIntyre
167 (2006). For further philosophical discussion about the possible meanings of “unconscious,” see
Moore, supra note 15, at 126–42.
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have roughly comparable credentials, except that one applicant, who is
black, performed slightly better in the job interview, while the other
applicant, who is white, has slightly more work experience. In her own
private deliberations about which applicant would be the best
candidate for the job, the employer decides that work experience is the
most important factor. The employer therefore chooses the white
applicant. Although the employer is aware of each applicant’s race, she
honestly believes that her choice was based on the white applicant’s
superior work experience, and she can honestly deny any conscious
consideration of the candidates’ race in her decisionmaking. However,
despite the employer’s honest belief, her decision was in fact
influenced by unconscious bias in favor of whites and against blacks.
More specifically, if it had been the black applicant who had more
work experience and the white applicant who had done better in the
interview, the employer would still have selected the white applicant,
but she would have done so on the basis of her superior performance in
32
the interview; and she would have genuinely believed that this was the
basis of her choice.

The truth of the matter in the “Work Experience” case is, in short,
that the employer had an unconscious disposition to disfavor the black
applicant. She acted from that disposition, all the while believing that she
was acting on a reason that had nothing to do with the race of the
applicants, when, in fact, her professed reason for action was really just a
secondary, epiphenomenal rationalization that effectively shielded her
own bias from introspective discovery. Yet, the employer’s professed
reliance on the chosen applicant’s credentials is not a conscious cover or
pretext for discrimination, because she genuinely believed it was her
reason for acting. But, by hypothesis, it is the subconscious influence of
the employer’s awareness of the race of the applicants that actually
explains her action.
In conjunction with these facts, let us imagine also that testing
methods or other modes of proof exist that allow us to determine that
despite the employer’s good faith disavowal of bias, and despite her
subjective belief that she acted on a perfectly legitimate consideration in
choosing the white candidate, her awareness of the race of the black
applicant did in fact (more likely than not) influence her decision to
select the white candidate instead, such that the employer would have
selected the white candidate over the black one even if their application
33
dossiers had been switched.

32. This hypothetical scenario is loosely inspired by actual research studies. See Michael I. Norton
et al., Mixed Motives and Racial Bias: The Impact of Legitimate and Illegitimate Criteria on Decision
Making, 12 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 36, 41–42 (2006); Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen,
Constructed Criteria: Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination, 16 Psychol. Sci. 474, 475, 477–78
(2005).
33. Larry Alexander constructs a similar hypothetical case of unconscious race-based preference
in the context of a broad and comprehensive discussion of the moral wrongness of discrimination
generally. See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences,
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The foregoing hypothesized facts establish a scenario in which an
employer’s selection of a job candidate is provably affected by
unconscious bias. My two assumptions allow us to discuss this scenario
without getting mired in internecine disputes about implicit bias or
practical proof problems. Important matters, to be sure, but setting them
aside allows us to see clearly the hard question for theorizing about
unconscious discrimination: Should an employment action—like our
hypothetical employer’s selection of the white job candidate—give rise to
employment discrimination liability when the action was provably
affected by the actor’s unconscious bias with respect to a statutorily
protected classification, even when the actor consciously acted only on
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons? This is the hard question because
it lays bare the question of how the law should respond to provable
unconscious discrimination. Given the imagined facts in the “Work
Experience” case, should the employer be subject to liability under the
employment discrimination laws?

III. Legal Background
I approach the question primarily as a normative, theoretical one.
But before moving to that question, This Part briefly discusses how a
claim of unconscious discrimination might fare under current case law
and whether such a claim would fit the relevant statutory text.
A. Case Law
An argument for liability on the hypothesized facts of the “Work
Experience” case probably would not succeed under currently accepted
judicial frameworks of analysis. First, it is unlikely that our hypothetical
black job candidate would prevail on a disparate treatment claim under
34
35
Title VII, which requires a showing of discriminatory intent or motive.
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 149, 180 (1992). Alexander’s imagined case involves a
sports fan whose unconscious bias causes his allegiances to shift toward whichever hometown team
happens to be the most predominantly white, even though he does not believe he is biased and in fact
“rejects all biased judgments at the conscious level.” See id.
34. The basic statutory cause of action for discrimination on a theory of disparate treatment is
provided in § 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). The framework
for analyzing the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim under the statute is set forth in the Supreme Court’s
decisions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1973), and its progeny. See, e.g.,
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–43 (2000); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506–12 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–56
(1981).
35. Justice O’Connor stated this point unequivocally in Reeves, although the significance of
unconscious bias was not an issue in that case: “The ultimate question in every employment
discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff was the victim of
intentional discrimination.” 530 U.S. at 153; see also Blasi, supra note 21, at 17 (“The fundamental
schema of anti-discrimination laws is borrowed from the law of intentional torts: plaintiff victims of
discrimination are permitted to sue defendant employers for damages if they can establish disparate
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More specifically, the rejected candidate might be able to make out a
36
prima facie case, but the employer’s assertion that the hiring of the
white applicant was based on consideration of the applicant’s work
experience would constitute a nondiscriminatory rationale that would
37
rebut the inference of discrimination generated by the prima facie case.
Ultimately, the plaintiff’s success would depend on proof that the
38
defendant’s stated reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. On
the assumed facts of the “Work Experience” case, however, that proof
would not be possible, as we are stipulating that the employer can
honestly assert that she consciously based her decision on a comparative
39
evaluation of work experience. In short, our hypothetical employer is
not subject to liability on any conventional theory of intentional
40
41
discrimination. This should hardly be surprising and, indeed, is part of
treatment ‘because of’ the employee’s race, sex, or other protected category.”). For arguments that
disparate treatment liability does not necessarily require proof of conscious discriminatory intent, see
infra note 41.
36. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) (explaining that in
general, the requirement of the prima facie case merely requires plaintiff to demonstrate that the
challenged employment action did not result from plaintiff’s lack of qualifications or the absence of a
job vacancy); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (stating that the prima
facie case should be understood flexibly).
37. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
38. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
39. See, e.g., Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 13–14 (1st Cir. 1995) (applying the McDonnell Douglas
framework to reject plaintiff’s claim on grounds that plaintiff failed to establish that improper motive
resulted in the layoff and therefore, that plaintiff’s evidence did not support an inference of
discrimination); see also Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate:
Locating Employer Wrong, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 849, 877–80 (2007); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 980.
See generally Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002); Krieger & Fiske, supra note 9,
at 1034–38 (describing and criticizing the “honest belief” rule).
40. Nor is there any basis, on the hypothesized facts, for disparate treatment liability under a
“pattern or practice” theory, under which an inference of discriminatory intent could be drawn from
statistically significant racial patterns in an employer’s hiring or promotion practices. See Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309–12 (1977); Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339–40. It is unclear
whether the imagined facts of “Work Experience” would be sufficient to make it a “mixed motives”
case subject to the “motivating factor” liability standard articulated in § 703(m) of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). However, I would think that a court that understood
the case law to require proof of conscious consideration of a protected characteristic as a basis for
disparate treatment liability would probably interpret the “motivating factor” language of § 703(m) to
refer to conscious motives. This is simply a claim about how I would expect most courts to read the
statute if the issue of unconscious discrimination were squarely presented. As I argue below in Part
III.B., the literal statutory text of Title VII arguably does not require such a reading and, in fact, seems
open to the possibility of liability based on unconscious bias.
41. Some commentators have argued that the cases do not clearly support the claim that disparate
treatment claims depend on proof of conscious bias, animus, or consideration of a protected
characteristic. In an article published in 2000, Ann McGinley proposed a reading of the case law under
which unconscious bias could constitute pretext where the employer’s decisionmaker is “mistaken”
about the relevant facts, such as the qualifications of the affected employees or job candidates. See
McGinley, supra note 2, at 453–56. Katharine Bartlett has also argued that the cases do not uniformly
support the claim that disparate treatment claims depend on proof of discriminatory intent in the
sense of conscious bias or animus. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 1922–24.
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42

the point of our imagined scenario.
Second, it is similarly unlikely that the rejected black candidate in
the “Work Experience” case would have a conventional disparate impact
claim. Although Title VII disparate impact claims, unlike disparate
43
treatment claims, do not require proof of discriminatory intent, they do
44
require that the plaintiff identify “a particular employment practice”
45
that creates a significant disparate impact. In our example, neither of
those elements is present. It is (for all we know) a singular case of
adverse treatment not tied to any particular employment practice as
46
such, and there is no observed disparate impact apart from the effect of
the employer’s decision on the two managerial candidates under
discussion. It might be possible that the aggregate consequences of the
employer’s discretionary decisionmaking procedure over time would
47
reflect a pattern that could support a disparate impact claim, but that
possibility depends on facts that go beyond my hypothetical. The
question is not whether we could add further facts that would support a
claim of discrimination, but whether the hypothesized singular decision
42. There is some authority, at least in the First Circuit, that unconscious reliance on
discriminatory stereotypes may be sufficient to establish the discriminatory intent required for a
disparate treatment claim. See Swallow v. Fetzer Vineyards, 46 F. App’x 636, 644 (1st Cir. 2002);
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 138 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999); Small v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 584 F.
Supp. 2d 284, 294 (D. Mass. 2008) (stating that circumstantial evidence could be used to show pretext).
It seems to me an interesting question whether the notion of an unconscious reliance on a racial
stereotype is different from implicit bias generally. Cf. Selmi, supra note 23, at 1241 (suggesting that
not all stereotypes may influence behavior). I would note that a discriminatory stereotype is typically
perceived of as an illegitimate belief about attributes of members of the stereotyped class. Thus, the
concept of unconsciously acting on a stereotype may centrally involve the idea of an unconscious
belief. Depending on our understanding of belief, this sort of unconscious bias seems arguably
distinguishable from, or at least a special case of, unconscious bias as I have conceptualized it, namely,
as a functional state or disposition, as opposed to a cognitive state with propositional content. See
supra notes 15–21 and accompanying text. In any event, the unconscious stereotype cases are not
particularly apposite to the present discussion, because the facts of “Work Experience” are not meant
to suggest that the employer’s action there is based on any reliance, unconscious or otherwise, on any
stereotype as such. For further discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 85–90.
43. As Justice Kennedy explained in his opinion for the Court in Ricci v. DeStefano, “Title VII
prohibits both intentional discrimination (known as ‘disparate treatment’) as well as, in some cases,
practices that are not intended to discriminate but in fact have a disproportionately adverse effect on
minorities (known as ‘disparate impact’).” 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009); see also Teamsters, 431 U.S. at
335–36 n.15 (explaining the difference between disparate treatment and disparate impact claims).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
45. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678 (characterizing the prima facie case of disparate impact liability to
require “essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity”); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994–95 (1988); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982).
46. The statute excuses the plaintiff from showing that a particular employment practice caused
the disparate impact at issue in certain circumstances not relevant here. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(1)(B)(i) (“[I]f the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a
respondent’s decision-making process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking
process may be analyzed as one employment practice.”).
47. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 989–96; cf. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 n.44
(1978).
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to select the white candidate instead of the black candidate in the “Work
Experience” case itself constitutes actionable discrimination.
B. The Literal Statutory Argument for Liability
Although my central concern is with the normative question of
liability for unconscious discrimination, it is worth pausing, to make an
observation about the statutory language that forms the basis for the
disparate treatment cause of action under Title VII. I stated above that
an argument for liability on the facts of the “Work Experience”
hypothetical would be implausible under current case law. Such an
argument does not seem to be foreclosed, however, by the literal
48
language of Title VII. If one were to approach the statute afresh rather
than through the lens of Supreme Court precedent, one might very well
49
read it to permit the imposition of liability for unconscious bias.
The central liability provision of Title VII says that it is unlawful “to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race,
50
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Liability is thus predicated on
51
This
“discriminat[ion] . . . because of” a protected characteristic.
language implies that in order for liability to be imposed, there must be a
particular sort of relation between the adverse employment action in
question (the “discrimination”) and a protected characteristic of the
aggrieved individual, such as race—to wit, a relation captured by the
52
phrase “because of.”
The term “discriminate” is undefined in Title VII. The statutory
language does not expressly say that an action must involve conscious
consideration of a factor before it can constitute discrimination because

48. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 1922; Wax, supra note 6, at 982–84; cf. McGinley, supra note 2, at
447; Wax, supra note 2, at 1146.
49. My argument shows that liability for unconscious discrimination is not precluded by the
relevant statutory text. I make no claim about what Congress might have intended with regarded to
unconscious discrimination.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
51. Id. The relevant language of the ADEA is similar. See Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2006) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to . . . discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s age.”). Interestingly, the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 originally contained the same “because of” language in its general liability provision, but as part
of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, that “because of” language was replaced with the phrase “on
the basis of.” See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5(a), 122 Stat. 3553 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)).
52. Similarly, § 703(b) of Title VII, which is sometimes understood to provide textual support for
disparate impact liability, makes it unlawful for an employer “to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)
(emphasis added).
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of that factor. Although at times courts seem to suggest that
53
discrimination as such is inherently intentional, those claims tend to be
made in the context of distinguishing actionable discrimination from
differential treatment that is merely correlated with a proscribed
54
consideration, not in the context of distinguishing the legal significance
of unconscious rather than conscious bias. Indeed, since it is
uncontroversially true that Title VII’s conception of discrimination
encompasses liability for disparate impact, which does not depend upon
any showing of intentional consideration of any protected classification,
it seems impossible to read the term “discriminate” to preclude actions
influenced by unconscious bias.
The semantics of the “because of” construction seem similarly open
to the possibility of liability for unconscious discrimination. In ordinary
usage, when we say that a person acted “because of” some factor, we are
saying that the factor explains why the person so acted. But there is
nothing in the “because of” construction that necessarily implies that the
explanation must be in terms of the person’s conscious intention: the
construction “A did x because of y” does not necessarily imply that y was
55
A’s conscious rationale for doing x. It only implies, in ordinary usage,
that y is a consideration that helps explain A’s doing of x, a consideration
56
that tells us something about why A did x. No semantic distortion is
required to assert that the employer in our hypothetical “Work
Experience” case chose the white candidate “because of” race. The literal
terms of § 703(a) of Title VII, which prohibit “discriminat[ion] . . . because
57
of ” a protected characteristic, need not be read to apply only in cases
where an employer’s action is explained by the conscious consideration
58
of race or another protected characteristic.

53. See, e.g., United States v. North Carolina, 914 F. Supp. 1257, 1265 (E.D.N.C. 1996) (“The
concept of ‘unintentional discrimination’ is logically impossible.”).
54. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611–12 (1993).
55. Consider the sentence, “Smith flew to Florida because of y.” To be sure, y might be some
factor, like the warm weather, that Smith consciously considered. But it would make just as much
sense for y to be something wholly outside Smith’s conscious deliberation—for example, “Smith flew
to Florida because he boarded the wrong plane;” or even, “Smith flew to Florida because he was
under the spell of an evil demon.” Furthermore, there is nothing about the “because of” construction
that implies that the proposition “A did x because of y” must hold true for one and only one
specification of y. It might be true, for example, that Smith went to Florida because he wanted to be in
warm weather; but it might at the same time be true that Smith went to Florida because it evokes
pleasant memories of childhood vacations with his parents.
56. In a recent case interpreting the “because of” construction as it appears in the ADEA, Justice
Thomas asserted that “because of” entails a but-for causal relation. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350–51 (2009). It is true that specifying a causal relation between x and y is one way
of explaining x in terms of y. But as I argue below, it is not the only way.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
58. There are some reported decisions in which courts have suggested that an employer cannot be
held liable for discriminating against an employee “because of” a protected characteristic unless the
employer was actually aware that the employee possessed that characteristic. See, e.g., Geraci v.
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The language of the alternative proof standard articulated in
59
§ 703(m) of Title VII, generally thought to apply to “mixed motive”
60
cases, likewise does not seem to preclude liability for unconscious
discrimination. Under § 703(m), liability is established upon proof that
an impermissible classification was “a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
61
practice.” This language by itself does not preclude liability for
unconscious discrimination, so long as the “motivation” of an action is
understood to include unconscious as well as conscious influences that
62
bear on an employer’s decisionmaking. If we understand motivation
broadly to refer to an action’s actual psychological impetus, it does not
seem implausible to think of unconscious bias as something that can
63
“motivate” action. Thus, when an employer’s action is affected by
unconscious bias with respect to a prohibited consideration, it is
semantically plausible to claim the illegitimate consideration is “a
motivating factor” which would be sufficient to establish liability under
§ 703(m).
In the “Work Experience” case, it is stipulated that the race of the
two managerial candidates explains the employer’s action, even though

Moody-Tottrup, Int’l, Inc., 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996); Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928,
932–33 (7th Cir. 1995). The reason for rejecting liability in such cases, however, is that the employee’s
protected characteristic cannot possibly make a difference to an employer’s decision and, therefore,
cannot help explain it if that characteristic is not even known to the employer. The requirement of
awareness of the protected characteristic does not speak to whether the employer must be consciously
motivated by that awareness.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
60. There is presently considerable uncertainty about the circumstances in which the “motivating
factor” standard of § 703(m) governs the sufficiency of a Title VII plaintiff’s proof of discrimination.
The Supreme Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa rejected the imposition of a heightened evidentiary
requirement as a precondition to the application of § 703(m). 539 U.S. 90, 101–02 (2003). At the same
time, the Court assumed without deciding that § 703(m) is properly applied only to a certain subset of
disparate treatment cases (“mixed motive” cases), while other cases would presumably be governed by
the proof framework originally laid out in McDonnell Douglas. See id. at 94 n.1. The Desert Palace
Court declined, however, to provide positive guidance as to how the subset of cases governed by
§ 703(m) should be delineated. The Court’s silence has given rise to a divergence of approaches among
the circuit courts. Compare Ginger v. District of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1345–46 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(refusing to apply § 703(m) where plaintiff failed to argue a mixed motives theory of liability), with
Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1037–42 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying the
“motivating factor” standard of § 703(m) to a case in which the plaintiff had relied on McDonnell
Douglas to establish her prima facie case). See generally Michael J. Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences
Proving Discrimination, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1243 (2008) [hereinafter Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences]
(analyzing the relationship between McDonnell Douglas and the § 703(m) standard of proof); Michael
J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?,
53 Emory L.J. 1887 (2004) [hereinafter Zimmer, The New Discrimination] (discussing the logical
implications of Desert Palace for structures of proof in disparate treatment litigation).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
62. See Faigman et al., supra note 20, at 1397 (noting Congress’s silence on whether implicit bias
can constitute “a motivating factor”).
63. See id. at 1395–97.
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the employer did not consciously consider that factor. On this
assumption, it seems perfectly plausible to say that the employer chose
the white individual over the black one “because of such individual’s
64
65
race,” and also that the candidates’ race was “a motivating factor for”
the employer’s decision. The literal language of Title VII does not
foreclose holding the employer liable, even though she never acted on
any conscious consideration of race.
C. Summary
I have suggested that under existing case law, it would be difficult to
argue for employer liability on the facts of the “Work Experience” case,
even though a literal reading of the relevant text of Title VII does not
foreclose such an argument. Perhaps the more relevant observation,
though, is that courts have not had occasion to consider squarely the
precise issue that the hypothetical case presents. In the non-hypothetical
world, practical issues of proof and scientific validity make the question
of liability based on unconscious bias alone unripe for litigation and
66
judicial consideration. Thus, even if some case law could be understood
as allowing for the possibility of employer liability in our “Work
Experience” hypothetical, there is no authority that would unequivocally
support that result. In what follows, I turn my attention to the question
of whether the law ought to allow for such liability. Should our
employment discrimination laws permit the imposition of employer
liability based on proof of unconscious discrimination? What reasons are
there in favor of such liability? And what reasons might there be for the
law to remain inhospitable to such claims?

IV. The Normative Question
In this Part, I summarize various familiar arguments in favor of and
against adapting Title VII to account for unconscious discrimination. I
then explore why those “surface” arguments fail to provide a satisfactory
answer to the deeper normative question whether unconsciously biased
action should be regarded as legally actionable discrimination.
A. Surface Arguments
The arguments in favor of interpreting or reforming Title VII to
67
account for unconscious discrimination are familiar. These arguments

64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
65. Id. § 2000e-2(m).
66. See Selmi, supra note 23, at 1243 (“[T]here is a veritable absence of litigation over the
unconscious nature of discrimination, an issue that is rarely raised in reported cases.”).
67. For a concise survey of some of the reforms that have been proposed by scholars, see Bartlett,
supra note 1, at 1926–30.
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generally share the premise that unconscious bias not only is real in the
68
sense described above, but that it is pervasive. If that is so, then we
should expect it to be a significant source of workplace inequality and
unequal treatment, a source of inequality no less important than
intentional discrimination or the sort of practices that produce outcomes
cognizable as disparate impact. The basic argument, given this
expectation, is simple. If unconscious bias really does pervade
decisionmaking in the workplace, then it will be impossible to achieve
the most basic goals of employment discrimination law—to create
genuine equality of opportunity and to eliminate patterns of substantive
69
inequality that track protected categories —unless we adapt the law to
70
be able to respond to such bias.
Whether or not the employment discrimination laws can effectively
71
reduce the prevalence of bias, one thing they can do is to make local
corrections for resultant inequalities by allowing for the imposition of
liability where it can be proved that a forbidden bias—conscious or
unconscious—explains the adverse decision at issue. For example, by
invalidating the employer’s decision in the “Work Experience” case, the
law could correct an economic distribution (the allocation of the job to
the white candidate) that is traceable to an adverse racial attitude. This is
precisely the sort of distributive inequality that the employment
72
discrimination statutes are meant to address. A commitment to
73
achieving this basic goal of employment discrimination law thus creates
a reason in favor of extending its reach to include employment actions
74
influenced by unconscious bias.

68. See generally Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 1; Kang & Banaji, supra note 2, at 1072
(analyzing implicit bias and its pervasiveness).
69. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–01 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971).
70. See Krieger, supra note 2, at 1241; see also Eva Paterson et al., The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection in the 21st Century: Building Upon Charles Lawrence’s Vision to Mount a Contemporary
Challenge to the Intent Doctrine, 40 Conn. L. Rev. 1175, 1195 (2008).
71. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination Law’s Effects on Implicit Bias, in 3 NYU Selected
Essays on Labor and Employment Law: Behavioral Analyses of Workplace Discrimination,
supra note 21, at 69, 73.
72. Cf. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988) (arguing that
“subconscious stereotypes and prejudices” that infect “undisciplined” subjective decision making are a
“lingering form of the problem that Title VII was enacted to combat” and should be subject to Title
VII liability, insofar as such decisionmaking “has precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by
impermissible intentional discrimination”).
73. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (noting that a central purpose of
Title VII is “making persons whole for injuries” resulting from discrimination).
74. The argument for liability need not exclude the possibility that an employer could voluntarily
undertake measures to reduce the effects of bias. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev,
Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational Level, 59 Hastings L.J. 1435, 1438–54 (2008)
(discussing steps to reduce unconscious discrimination that may reduce or insulate underlying levels of
implicit bias).
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On the other side, there are a variety of arguments against liability
for unconscious discrimination. Some of them seem predicated primarily
75
on skepticism about the actuality of unconscious discrimination or on
the practical and epistemological difficulties of establishing that a
76
particular action was in fact influenced by unconscious bias.
Other arguments against liability for unconscious discrimination
raise empirical concerns about efficacy. For example, one might contend
that holding employers liable for unconscious discrimination will not
significantly improve workplace equality stemming from implicit bias
because even if such liability might provide corrective action in a tiny
number of litigated cases, it would not effectively reduce the actual
77
incidences of implicit bias in the employment context. In addition,
liability for unconscious discrimination could actually have adverse
consequences for minorities in the workplace. Such liability might
increase the predicted costs of hiring employees who are members of a
78
statutorily protected group. Further, perceptions that such liability
would be unfairly punitive could create a counterproductive backlash of
resistance and negative attitudes toward the law, which could impede the
79
internalization of antidiscrimination norms by workplace actors.
B. The Deeper Problem
All of the foregoing arguments, though, miss a deeper point of
contention, a potential source of reluctance to embrace the possibility of
liability for unconscious discrimination that does not simply boil down to
skepticism about the efficacy of such a regime in achieving desired goals
and does not depend on disproving that such liability would in fact
reduce workplace inequality. In other words, I think that liability for
unconscious discrimination would remain controversial even if there
were conclusive evidence that it would in fact reduce workplace
inequality overall. The question I want to explore is: why?
From a skeptical perspective, all of the arguments in favor of
liability for unconscious discrimination are question-begging in a crucial
way. They presuppose that something objectionable happens whenever
an employer action was causally influenced by a protected characteristic
of the adversely affected individual, regardless of whether the employer
genuinely believed she had adequate reasons for the action. In other

75. For references to some of the critical literature, see Bartlett, supra note 1, at 1896 n.4.
76. See Wax, supra note 6, at 981–86. These worries are largely mooted by my working
assumption that unconscious discrimination is real.
77. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 2, at 986–87.
78. Cf. Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 Harv. L. Rev.
642, 686–87 (2001) (arguing that antidiscrimination laws impose greater costs to employers because
they must employ certain employees against customer and coworker attitudes).
79. See Bartlett, supra note 1, at 1936–41.
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words, the arguments assume that if a protected characteristic is part of
the causal predicate that explains what happened, then a corrective
response is in order. This is surely a plausible position, but it assumes an
answer to the hard question at hand. The hard question is precisely
whether, as a matter of discrimination law, we should believe something
objectionable occurred when, though an employer genuinely sought to
act on permissible—even justifiable—reasons, the employer’s actions
were influenced by an employee’s protected characteristic.
Consider again the “Work Experience” hypothetical. Suppose that
we were completely convinced that, from a systemic perspective, a
regime of liability for unconscious discrimination was necessary to
achieve meaningful reductions of race-based inequality in employment.
Would we then have to conclude, as a matter of logic, that the
employer’s decision in the “Work Experience” case should be treated as
actionable discrimination? I do not believe so, and the reason is that
policy arguments of the sort canvassed above do not reach the deepest
point of controversy. That question is whether we should regard the
employer’s action as legally invalid simply because it was precipitated by
implicit bias, even though the reasons on which the employer consciously
sought to act were in fact legally adequate to justify the decision that she
made. Claiming that the decision should be legally invalid because it had
a race-related cause simply begs the critical question of what,
fundamentally, the legal charge of discrimination entails. Should the
objection entail only that the action in question was causally influenced
by a protected characteristic? Or should it entail that the action’s
justification was invalid or defective in virtue of incorporating an
illegitimate consideration? Should the legal charge of discrimination be
understood fundamentally as a demand for justification of action, or as a
call for a causal inquiry into an historical event?

V. Causal and Justificatory Conceptions of Discrimination
The question, in short, is whether employment discrimination law
should embrace a conception of discrimination that hinges on
examination of the causal history of an employment event or, in contrast,
on the putative justificatory rationale of the employer’s action. The first
view—call it a “causal” conception of discrimination—would incline
toward a finding of liability in the “Work Experience” case because it is
clear that the rejected candidate’s race, a protected characteristic, is
necessary to a complete explanation of what actually brought about the
80
observed result. The other view—call it a “justificatory” conception—

80. See Krieger, supra note 2, at 1242 (“The critical inquiry would be whether the applicant or
employee’s group status ‘made a difference’ in the employer’s action, not whether the decisionmaker
intended that it make a difference.”).
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would probably find no actionable discrimination in the “Work
Experience” hypothetical, because no forbidden consideration played
any role in the justificatory rationale that informed the employer’s own
understanding of her decision about which candidate to hire.
Doubts about liability for unconscious discrimination on the facts of
the “Work Experience” case, even with all of the accompanying
stipulations, come from the perspective of a justificatory conception of
discrimination. I argue in this Part that the justificatory conception is
engrained in our current law, and that the causal conception would
represent a radical shift in our understanding of what discrimination is,
not just an incremental expansion of the scope of the employment
discrimination laws.
What I am calling the deep distinction between the causal and
justificatory conceptions of discrimination does not simply reduce to a
question about whether discrimination should be restricted to intentional
acts of differential treatment on the basis of a forbidden consideration, or
whether the law should also impose liability for unintentional acts of
differential treatment. The unease we may feel about liability for
unconscious discrimination is not explained by some general objection to
liability in the absence of intent to discriminate. After all, the law already
provides a cause of action—the disparate impact claim—that allows the
imposition of liability for discrimination even in the absence of any
intention to treat individuals differently on account of a protected
characteristic. Because our employment discrimination law already
countenances liability in the absence of discriminatory intent, the deep
objection to liability for unconscious discrimination cannot be based on a
normative difficulty relating to that consideration. The problem with
liability for unconscious discrimination must be something else.
If the law already accepts the possibility of liability in the absence of
discriminatory intent, why should it have a problem with liability for
unconscious discrimination? My claim is that the difficulty with liability
for unconscious discrimination is that such liability depends on a causal
conception of discrimination that displaces the significance of a
justificatory one. Returning to the facts of the “Work Experience” case
may help to illustrate the difference. We have been focusing on the
stipulated fact that the employer’s decision to hire the white job
candidate was precipitated by an unconscious psychological disposition
to disfavor blacks (or to favor whites). But there is another important
assumed fact: namely, that the employer’s subjective motivation in
acting—her belief that the white applicant was the better candidate
because of her work experience—is nondiscriminatory and, what is more,
seems to reflect an objectively adequate reason for selecting that
candidate. Superiority of work experience is a legitimate consideration
that can provide sufficient reason for preferring one job candidate over
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another—in other words, a permissible reason for the sort of decision in
question.
We can gain an important insight by asking what principle is implied
by the claim that the employer’s selection of the white applicant in the
“Work Experience” case should be regarded as actionable
discrimination. I argue that it implies that the objective justifiability of an
action from the perspective of the actor’s genuine understanding of the
relevant considerations matters less than an agent-neutral inquiry into
the factors that had a causal influence on the ultimate outcome. The
causal inquiry trumps and displaces the justificatory one for purposes of
determining whether an action constitutes discrimination. In other
words, if our hypothetical employer is liable, that means the objective
adequacy of her own genuine reasons-based explanation of her action
must yield to the causal psychological history that culminated in that act.
The legal status of the act depends on its psychological etiology, not on
the actor’s ability to satisfy a demand for justification.
This causal conception of actionable discrimination allows for the
imposition of liability even when the employer acted on considerations
that provide legitimate, adequate reasons for the adverse differential
treatment in question. I contend that this conception implicates a
fundamental change in the meaning of discrimination. It changes the
charge of discrimination from an action-guiding demand of equal respect
to a factual assertion about the psychology of the actor and transforms
the relevant inquiry from the quasi-moral business of calling upon the
employer to justify her action to the quasi-scientific business of
identifying the psychological causal antecedents of that action. In a
regime of liability for unconscious discrimination, the statutory
proscription against discrimination shifts from an action-guiding
principle that constrains the considerations that can justify differential
adverse treatment to a kind of mandatory tax on unconscious
contributions to the problem of workplace inequality.
A. Why the Law Resists Liability for Unconscious Discrimination
Is the shift to a causal conception of discrimination really a radical
change from the law’s current understanding? I believe it is. Consider
again the currently prevailing models of actionable discrimination. In a
disparate treatment action, an employer can respond to the charge of
discrimination by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
action at issue. Unless the aggrieved employee can prove that this
articulated reason was pretextual, the employer’s stated justification for
81
the adverse action will defeat the charge. Thus, the charge of
discrimination implies that either there were no nondiscriminatory
81. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509–11 (1993).
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reasons supporting the employer’s adverse action, or that the employer
acted on considerations that are statutorily proscribed. Conversely, if
there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, and if
that reason genuinely constituted the employer’s rationale for that
action, then there is no actionable discrimination on a disparate
83
treatment theory. The focus of the inquiry is on whether the employer’s
reasons—the employer’s rationale for acting—passes muster under a
84
principle of nondiscrimination. The statutory proscription serves as an
action-guiding constraint on the considerations that can count as valid
reasons for differential adverse treatment.
1. Current Predominance of the Justificatory Conception
Contemporary theories of disparate treatment based on social
stereotyping also fit within the justificatory conception of discrimination,
even though they might at first blush seem to incorporate causal
elements. In a stereotyping case, the plaintiff seeks to establish the intent
element of the disparate treatment claim by an allegation that the
employer acted on an illegitimate generalization about members of a
85
protected class. Treating a person differently because of such a
86
stereotype is clearly a form of actionable discrimination. Insofar as
prejudicial stereotypes that affect our judgments about others may be
largely inchoate and even subconscious, it might seem that liability based
87
on stereotypes is akin to liability based on unconscious discrimination
—therefore, disproving my claim that the causal conception of
discrimination is foreign to our current understanding. Liability based on
88
prejudicial stereotypes, however—whether conscious or unconscious —
cannot be reduced to a purely causal inquiry into whether a
psychological attitude influenced the actor’s cognition. A stereotype is

82. In which case, the employer could not meet its burden of production in the standard
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 255 (1981).
83. In a mixed-motives case, the plaintiff only need prove that one of the statutorily forbidden
considerations was “a motivating factor” in the employer’s action, and the employer can be held liable
even if other considerations also motivated that action. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). This is typically understood to require some proof that the employer
took a statutorily forbidden consideration into account, even though it also relied on other factors in
taking the adverse action at issue. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2003). Thus,
even in a mixed-motives case, there is no actionable discrimination unless a discriminatory reason
constitutes at least part of the employer’s own true understanding of the basis for its action.
84. See, e.g., Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254–56.
85. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989).
86. See id. at 239.
87. See Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences, supra note 60, at 1279 (“[E]vidence of stereotypical
thinking supports an ultimate inference of intent to discriminate precisely because it is an unconscious
expression of bias.”).
88. See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 138 F.3d 38, 58 (1st Cir. 1999).
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arguably a form of propositional belief, a schematic construct that
90
provides putative reasons for action or judgment. To act on a stereotype
is to act, consciously or unconsciously, on the basis of a belief about
members of a particular class—e.g., “all X’s have property F” or “all
good Y’s exhibit behavior G.” The legal invalidation of actions based on
such stereotypes entails a judgment that beliefs of that sort are not to be
regarded as legitimate reasons for taking an adverse employment action.
Holding an employer liable for acting on a prejudicial stereotype
constitutes a rejection of a putative rationale—namely, the stereotyping
belief—for the action, a refutation of the action’s true justification. The
same cannot be said for holding the employer liable for the sort of
unconscious discrimination illustrated in the “Work Experience” case,
because the employer’s action, by hypothesis, does not entail any sort of
racial stereotyping beliefs, conscious or otherwise. There, the predicate
for liability is the causal influence of a racial attitude (a negative
disposition toward blacks) in the employer’s formation of her rationale
for action—in other words, that work experience is more important than
interview performance, not the objectionable nature of the rationale
itself as a principle of action.
Finally, even the disparate impact cause of action evinces a
justificatory conception of actionable discrimination, not a causal one.
While it is of course true that disparate impact liability does not require
91
proof of intent to discriminate, the disparate impact cause of action
must still ultimately be conceived as an evaluation of the employer’s
rationale in carrying out whatever practices created the observed
disparities in question. This is so because the employer can avoid liability
by proving that the particular employment practice that created the
observed disparate outcomes was “job related . . . and consistent with
92
business necessity.” In other words, although the employer rather than
the plaintiff bears the burden of proving business necessity, the
important point is that the employer can avoid liability, even in a
disparate impact case, by showing that the challenged employment
93
practice was justified by adequate reasons. Although the plaintiff can
establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing that the
94
employer’s practices caused a certain pattern of inequality, liability

89. See Krieger, supra note 2, at 1195 (“Stereotypes are correlational constructs.”).
90. See Patrick S. Shin, Vive la Différence? A Critical Analysis of the Justification of SexDependent Workplace Restrictions on Dress and Grooming, 14 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 491, 499–
501 (2007) (discussing different types of behavior leading to stereotypes).
91. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009).
92. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
93. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2678–81 (explaining that liability for disparate impact ultimately
depends on the employer’s inability to prove that its practices were justified by business necessity, or a
less discriminatory alternative to those practices was available).
94. See id. at 2677–78.
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depends upon a justificatory inquiry into whether the employer’s
practices were necessary: Were those practices justified by good business
reasons, and were they justified even in light of other available
95
alternatives? If the practices were justified, then the employer prevails,
even though the employer’s practices might continue to cause racially
96
disparate consequences. Disparate impact liability therefore depends
ultimately on a test of the adequacy of the employer’s putative rationale.
In this context, no less than in the case of disparate treatment, the
prohibition of discrimination can be seen as an action-guiding demand
for justification, a requirement that employment practices that adversely
affect members of protected groups be backed by a legally sufficient
reason.
2. Liability for Unconscious Discrimination and the Causal
Conception
Consider, in contrast, the conception of actionable discrimination
implied by the possibility of liability in the “Work Experience”
hypothetical. In that case, there seems to be an acceptable justification
for the decision to hire the white applicant (a preference for work
experience), and this justification constitutes the employer’s ostensive
rationale, her genuine understanding of the basis of her action. We
cannot say that the employer lacked adequate justification for hiring the
white applicant, nor can we say that the decision was unjustified under
the employer’s rationale. A view under which this employer’s decision is
regarded as actionably discriminatory effectively rejects the idea that we
should give controlling significance to the question of the adequacy of
the action’s rationale. What is controlling is that the employer’s
reasoning, whether or not it was sufficient to justify the action, was in fact
97
influenced by her awareness of the race of the two applicants.
Moreover, if the employer is liable because of the operation of
unconscious bias, then, in an important way, the proscription against
discrimination ceases to be an action-guiding constraint on employment
98
action. In the “Work Experience” case, by hypothesis, the employer did
not treat any illicit consideration as a reason in favor of her decision, and
the bias that influenced her act does not represent any attitude or

95. See id. at 2678–81.
96. See id.
97. Recall that we are assuming that the employer would have reasoned to the opposite
conclusion but for the rejected applicant’s being black.
98. As Linda Krieger has described the argument, “the normative utility of a rule prohibiting
discrimination depends entirely on decisionmaker self-awareness. . . . Absent decisionmaker selfawareness, the nondiscrimination principle—if framed solely as a prohibitory injunction ‘not to
discriminate’—loses its normative mooring.” Krieger, supra note 2, at 1186. Professor Krieger argues,
of course, that discrimination should not be defined in terms of a violation of that sort of prohibitory
injunction. See id. at 1239–40.
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judgment that the employer himself would endorse. If liability is imposed
in cases like the “Work Experience” hypothetical, then the statutory
proscription becomes more akin to what might be regarded as a tax, a
mandatory cost levied against the operation of the employer’s
unconscious bias, regardless of the employer’s ability to justify her action
under nondiscriminatory principles.
The conceptual shift implicated by liability for unconscious
discrimination, then, is a shift from a prescriptive, action-guiding regime
that constrains the considerations that can provide legitimate reasons for
adverse action to a primarily diagnostic regime that focuses on ferreting
out potential psychological causes of persisting workplace inequality.
The prohibition against discrimination changes from a demand that
employers be prepared to justify their actions on grounds that do not
involve a protected characteristic to a statement putting employers on
notice that actions that adversely affect members of protected groups will
give rise to liability upon proof that the actions were causally influenced
by such a characteristic. This is a move from a quasi-moral, justificationbased conception of discrimination to a quasi-scientific, psychologicalcausal conception.
It is true that, in a way, our current conception of discrimination is
already partly psychological and depends, as legal responsibility does
more generally, on proof of causation. Disparate treatment liability
depends, for example, on an examination of what a decisionmaker
actually considered and believed, and that sort of inquiry is in some sense
a matter of identifying the considerations that were causally relevant in
99
the actor’s actual psychology. So, I am certainly not denying that
causation is relevant to the law’s current conception of discrimination,
nor am I trying to make any sort of broad claim about the notions of
causation that figure into legal doctrines governing responsibility more
100
generally. My claim is that the argument in favor of liability for
unconscious discrimination departs radically from our current conception
of discrimination, because it requires cleaving the causation inquiry
entirely from any evaluation of the adequacy of the agent’s subjective
101
rationale for the action in dispute.

99. See Zimmer, A Chain of Inferences, supra note 60, at 1244 (discussing the requirement that
the plaintiff prove a “link” between the defendant’s discriminatory motive and the adverse
employment action at issue).
100. For a careful and exhaustive inquiry into the concepts of causation that are implicit and
explicit in doctrines of responsibility in criminal law and torts, see generally Michael S. Moore,
Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics (2009).
101. Sheila Foster has made the point, albeit in the service of a much different thesis than I am
propounding here, that “the causal inquiry in antidiscrimination cases [under current law] is
evaluative, not explanatory.” Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent
Versus Impact, 41 Hous. L. Rev. 1469, 1517 (2005) (emphasis omitted) (cautioning that determinations
about the causes of a decision or set of consequences may themselves be subject to the influence of
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It is also true that the current legal framework governing disparate
treatment claims requires a causal inquiry relating to the actor’s
psychology in the limited sense that liability depends upon figuring out
what beliefs, perceptions, and judgments actually constituted the
102
rationale on which the employer relied in acting as she did. But on the
model of discrimination that would impose liability for unconscious bias,
the inquiry bypasses the actor’s putative rationale and seeks an
explanation of the act in terms of any aspect of the actor’s psychology—
not just the beliefs and attitudes that the actor himself would endorse—
that could be regarded as a causal influence. What is radical here is the
implicit premise that whenever an unconscious bias can be identified as a
causal influence, liability is justified, even if the actor’s own rationale for
acting provides adequate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the action in
question. On the causal conception, when inquiries into the actor’s
genuine rationale and the scientifically determinable psychological
causes of her action yield different answers to the question whether a
protected characteristic made a difference to the actor’s decision, then it
is the scientific psychological cause, not our putative reason-giving, that
controls whether the action should be regarded as objectionable
discrimination.
3. Precepts of Responsibility
What explains the felt reluctance to embrace liability for
unconscious discrimination is, I think, the philosophical tension between
(a) conceiving of an action as a product of scientifically determinable,
subterranean psychological causes; and (b) conceiving of that action as
the sort of thing for which an agent should be held responsible in any
103
robust sense. In the context of practical debates about whether to hold
a person responsible for an act, to explain a given act as the determined
consequence of antecedent historical causes normally has the force of
104
preempting claims of moral responsibility for the act. This tendency
should be familiar from basic philosophical debates about criminal
implicit biases and stereotyping beliefs).
102. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56 (1981).
103. This general tension is one of the central themes of the philosophy of action or action theory.
Seminal contemporary works that identify many of the questions that have occupied theorists in this
field include G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention (Harvard Univ. Press 2d ed. 2000), Donald Davidson,
Essays on Actions and Events (1980), and Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in Free Will
59–80 (Gary Watson ed., 1982). For an accessible discussion of how some of these questions apply in
the context of criminal law, see R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency & Criminal Liability: Philosophy of
Action and the Criminal Law (1990).
104. Note that I am making a claim about the force of deterministic causal explanations in the
context of practical deliberation about whether to hold a person responsible for an act. I am not
suggesting, and in fact would deny, that causal explanations in general are incompatible with
attributions of responsibility. For philosophical perspectives that inform my own views on this latter
question, see T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other 248–94 (1998); R. Jay Wallace,
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments 51–83 (1994).
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105

responsibility. We might be reminded of Chief Justice Weintraub’s
106
concurring opinion in State v. Sikora. The issue for the court there had
to do with the legal relevance of expert psychiatric testimony opining
that a criminal defendant’s act of murder was “motivated by the
107
predetermined influence of his unconscious” and therefore lacked the
108
level of intentionality required for a conviction of first degree murder.
More interesting for present purposes than the court’s holding on this
109
question is the philosophical question taken up by Chief Justice
Weintraub in his concurrence. His concurrence is notable because of how
strikingly, yet to opposite effect, his discussion relates to the question of
liability for unconscious discrimination:
The psychiatric view [of the defendant’s criminal act] seems quite
scientific. It rests upon the elementary concept of cause and effect. The
individual is deemed the product of many causes. As a matter of
historical fact, he was not the author of any of the formative forces, nor
of his capacity or lack of capacity to deal with them. . . .
....
. . . [The psychiatrist] traces a man’s every deed to some cause truly
beyond the actor’s own making, and says that although the man was
aware of his action, he was unaware of assembled forces in his
unconscious which decided his course. Thus the conscious is a puppet,
110
and the unconscious the puppeteer.

Characterizing the psychiatrist’s view as likening the criminal defendant
111
to an “automaton whose unconscious directs . . . antisocial deeds,”
Justice Weintraub argues that this view is “simply irreconcilable” with
the very possibility of criminal responsibility:
To grant a role in our existing [legal] structure to the theme that the
conscious is just the innocent puppet of a nonculpable unconscious is to
make a mishmash of the criminal law, permitting—indeed requiring—
each trier of the facts to choose between the automaton thesis and the
law’s existing concept of criminal accountability. It would be absurd to
decide criminal blameworthiness upon a psychiatric thesis which can
find no basis for personal blame. So long as we adhere to criminal
blameworthiness, mens rea must be sought and decided at the level of
112
conscious behavior.

Justice Weintraub sees the causal model of action (the picture of the
conscious actor as the puppet of unconscious motives) as antithetical to

105. See generally Duff, supra note 103, at 101–02.
106. 210 A.2d 193, 204–07 (N.J. 1965).
107. Id. at 201 (majority opinion).
108. See id. at 202.
109. The court concluded that the psychiatric testimony at issue was inadmissible on the question
of guilt but admissible for purposes of determining punishment. See id. at 204.
110. Id. at 205 (Weintraub, C.J., concurring).
111. Id. at 206.
112. Id. at 207.
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the notion of criminal responsibility, and he argues that our practices of
placing criminal blame imply a rejection of that model. From this
perspective, the argument for liability based on implicit bias seems to go
directly against the grain of conventional arguments about the necessary
113
conditions of holding someone responsible for an action. Normally, to
view an act as caused by factors outside the actor’s control and
awareness, and which are severed from the actor’s conscious attitudes
114
and beliefs, runs counter to holding the actor responsible. The
argument for liability in the “Work Experience” case is a direct rejection
of that familiar philosophical dynamic. It is, in fact, an argument in favor
of liability that depends on thinking of the employer’s action in
predominantly causal terms. The argument, counterintuitively, is that the
employer should be held liable because she acts as a puppet controlled by
her unconscious motivations. No wonder the idea of liability for
unconscious discrimination seems so deeply controversial, even with all
of the assumptions we have been indulging.
C. Implications of a Commitment to the Causal Conception
To say that the idea is controversial, of course, is not to say that it is
wrong. My observations about the conceptual implications of liability for
unconscious discrimination do not, in themselves, recommend for or
against such liability. Perhaps we should want to shift our understanding
of discrimination to accommodate a more scientific approach; perhaps
we are misguided to conceive of human action as anything other than the
115
result of causes that lie beyond our will. At least as a purely textual
116
matter, as I argued above, Title VII’s vague “because of” language
seems to invite a causal interpretation of discrimination in a way that the
117
fundamental principles governing criminal liability manifestly do not.
Yet, I do think there are important theoretical problems with a causal
conception of discrimination that go beyond its merely being
counterintuitive. I have explained that our felt reservation about liability
for unconscious discrimination might be rooted in its connection with a
causal conception of action. In the remainder of this Article, I offer some

113. I am making a claim here about precepts of choice and responsibility that inform our actual
practices of holding persons responsible. Cf. Scanlon, supra note 104, at 277–80.
114. See id. Again, to be clear, I deny (for reasons elaborated by Scanlon) that responsibility
presupposes control over the causes of our actions in any sense that would be incompatible with
philosophical determinism. See id. For another concise argument that there is no relevant sense of
“control” that governs attributions of responsibility, see Moore, supra note 100, at 24–26.
115. For an example of this view based on psychological science, see Daniel M. Wegner, The
Illusion of Conscious Will (2002); cf. Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World,
2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 601, 672–73.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 48–65.
117. My claim is about what the statutory text seems to permit, not about how courts have actually
understood it.
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possible concerns about incorporating such a conception into our legal
understanding of discrimination.
1. The Charge of Discrimination as Diagnosis
The first worry is that the scientific, causal conception of
discrimination diminishes the seriousness of the objection of
discrimination as a moral criticism of an individual’s or employer’s
118
action. On the traditional, reasons-based conception, to object to an
action as discrimination is to make a claim that the employer’s rationale
for the action was inadequate as a justification. The proscription of
discrimination, so understood, has clear action-guiding, prescriptive
force. From the perspective of the deliberating agent, it places a
constraint on what the agent can adopt or endorse as a rationale for
acting, a demand that the agent avoid acting on the basis of certain
specified considerations. We are warranted in criticizing an agent who
violates that demand, because everyone is morally answerable for acting
on the basis of justifications that are institutionally illegitimate or that we
could not reasonably expect others to accept.
The unconscious bias conception of discrimination shifts our focus
from the deliberative perspective—the view of ourselves as agents who
have the ability to choose the reasons on which we act—to a perspective
in which our actions are the result of unconscious psychological forces
119
that may be wholly unresponsive to any demand for reasons. To what
then, does the charge of discrimination on this view amount? Arguably,
it ceases to have moral significance at all, at least as a criticism of the
actor. In a scenario like that in the “Work Experience” case, where the
actor can genuinely disavow any prejudicial motive, and where the
actor’s unconscious bias does not reflect her conscious attitudes, beliefs,
and judgments, a charge of discrimination based on the fact of that bias is
120
hardly a criticism at all of the actor-as-moral-agent. The objection of
discrimination takes on a diagnostic character rather than a moral one. It
becomes primarily a claim that the action in question can be explained by
118. This concern is perhaps what underlies the argument advanced by certain critics that some
constructions of implicit bias are too overinclusive to have real legal or political significance. See Arkes
& Tetlock, supra note 8, at 264, 275. In the title of their critical article, Arkes and Tetlock ask the
question, “Would Jesse Jackson ‘Fail’ the Implicit Association Test?” See id. at 257. The authors
suggest that the answer is yes, which they take as a reason to be skeptical about the concept of implicit
bias. See id. at 264, 270. Put more generally, the argument is that any test of discriminatory bias that
could not be “passed” by someone like Jesse Jackson, an outspoken advocate for antidiscrimination
and equality, could not be capturing any worthwhile conception of discrimination. For a response to
this sort of argument, see Bagenstos, supra note 4, at 488–90.
119. See Denno, supra note 115, at 672–73.
120. For philosophical elaborations on this sort of view of the conditions under which it is
appropriate to blame an agent for wrongdoing, see Pamela Hieronymi, The Force and Fairness of
Blame, 18 Phil. Persp. 115 (2004); see also T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility,
Meaning, Blame 197–98 (2008); Scanlon, supra note 104, at 277–80; Angela M. Smith, Control,
Responsibility, and Moral Assessment, 138 Phil. Stud. 367 (2008).
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reference to a certain psychological cause that intruded on the actor’s
active agency, not a criticism of the actor’s exercise of that agency. The
agent might embody or be a carrier of an inequality-producing bias.
However, if that bias truly is not responsive to the agent’s own
judgments, then criticizing the agent for being influenced by that bias
would be akin to criticizing an individual for infecting someone with a
121
virus that the individual had no idea she was carrying. Such criticism
might be warranted to the extent that the individual had reason to take
122
precautions against passing on the virus, but absent such reason, the
123
criticism would be misplaced. The point is that if the charge of
discrimination on the causal conception can, at least in some instances,
entail nothing more than just such a diagnostic, explanatory claim, then
that conception arguably weakens the moral significance of the charge of
124
discrimination.
2. The Problem of Conceptual Instability: “Work Experience II”
The second worry is that the causal-psychological conception of
discrimination creates an instability in the law of employment
discrimination. The instability can be introduced with a simple question:
If we agree that an employer can be subject to liability on the basis of a
cause, such as implicit bias, that lies outside the awareness and judgment125
sensitive attitudes of the decisionmaker, why should liability be limited
to cases where that cause resides in the actor’s psychology? What is so
special about psychological causes of discrimination that lie in the actor?
Return for a last time to the hypothetical employer in the “Work
Experience” case. Let us change the facts a bit—call this variation of the
case “Work Experience II.” Suppose, now, that the employer does not
suffer from any implicit racial biases. Imagine again that our hypothetical

121. Cf. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 321 (1987) (analogizing racism to a “disease” or
“illness . . . that infects almost everyone”).
122. This would be analogous to the unconsciously biased actor having reason to take precautions
against the influence of her unknown biases.
123. For a rather different philosophical perspective, see George Sher, Who Knew?:
Responsibility Without Awareness (2009). On Sher’s account, an agent can be morally responsible
for an attitude that is causally connected to the agent’s “constitutive features,” see id. at 121–22, which
need not be aspects of the agent with which he would necessarily identify. See id. at 122 (suggesting
that even “neurophysiological mechanisms” might count as constitutive). Sher does not discuss the
problem of unconscious bias in detail, however, and it is not clear to me whether his view implies that
an agent will usually be morally responsible for her unconscious biases. The answer would depend, I
suppose, on which aspects of the agent’s psychology could be regarded as constitutive.
124. This worry about the causal conception of discrimination is not necessarily an argument
against negligence-based or strict liability, either in the context of employment discrimination or
elsewhere. Holding a person liable without requiring proof of intent is not the same thing as holding a
person liable for an action by virtue of the action’s being influenced by a causal factor outside the
scope of the actor’s agency. It is the latter sort of liability that is central to the causal conception.
125. Scanlon, supra note 104, at 20–24 (coining and explaining the term).
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employer selects the white candidate over the black candidate for an
open managerial position on the basis of the former candidate’s superior
work experience. But now let us suppose that we know a little bit more
about the background of our hypothetical black candidate. It turns out
that the reason that she has less work experience than the white
candidate is simply that she had great difficulty obtaining employment in
the early years of her career because of intentional discrimination by
other potential employers. Absent such discrimination, the black
candidate’s work experience would have been at least as extensive as the
white candidate’s.
Is the employer in the “Work Experience II” hypothetical subject to
liability for discrimination? I doubt anyone would say so. But if we have
adopted a causal conception of discrimination that allows liability based
on the influence of unconscious bias, it becomes strangely difficult to
justify that answer. It is literally true, after all, that the employer’s
selection of the white candidate is, indirectly, “because of” the black
candidate’s race. The factor of race is quite clearly essential to a full
causal explanation of the employer’s decision. We can presume that if
the candidate had been white, she would have achieved the same work
experience as the white candidate and so would not have been rejected—
at least not on the basis of work experience. We might be tempted to
argue that the employer in the “Work Experience II” case had no control
over the acts of prior potential employers and so cannot be held liable on
that basis, but this will not do. The employer in the “Work Experience”
case had no more control over her implicit and unconscious biases than
the employer in the “Work Experience II” case had over the prior
discriminatory causes of the black applicant’s lesser experience. We
might want to argue that the black candidate’s relative lack of work
experience is not the fault of the employer and so cannot be the basis for
liability, but again, this will not do. The employer in the original case also
was not necessarily at fault in any relevant sense for her implicit biases,
yet those biases are the anchor of liability on the causal conception of
discrimination. Finally, we might try to distinguish the cases on the
grounds that the cause of the black candidate’s rejection in the “Work
Experience II” hypothetical is prior societal discrimination, rather than
the employer’s own biases, but that argument simply begs the question of
why that distinction matters, given the irrelevance of the actor’s
awareness or responsibility under the causal conception of
discrimination.
The point is that if, as is the case with the causal conception, liability
for discrimination depends solely upon an inquiry into whether the
aggrieved person’s protected characteristics figures into an adequate
causal explanation of the adverse employment act, it becomes very
difficult to say why liability should be limited to those cases in which that
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causal explanation goes through the psychology of the employer’s
decisionmaker. To put it another way, the black candidate’s race is (by
hypothesis) a necessary causal condition of the adverse employment
action taken against her in both “Work Experience” and “Work
Experience II”. But if the employer’s action in the original “Work
Experience” constitutes objectionable discrimination simply in virtue of
the causal influence of race in the history of that action, then the action
in “Work Experience II” should also constitute objectionable
discrimination. On the causal conception of discrimination, there can be
no principled difference between the rejection of an applicant caused by
the employer’s unconscious racial bias, and the rejection of an applicant
based on a job-related deficiency that was caused by past circumstances
of racial inequality. Limiting liability to those adverse actions that are
caused by psychological influences linked to the aggrieved party’s
protected characteristics is an unstable position, or in any event an
analytically unsatisfying one.
3. Biting the Bullets
What are we to make of this instability? One possibility is that it sets
up a reductio ad absurdum of the causal conception. If the causal
conception of discrimination results in the absurd conclusion that the
employer’s action in the “Work Experience II” case constitutes
objectionable discrimination, then that proves that the causal conception
of discrimination should be rejected, as should the possibility of liability
for unconscious discrimination, which depends on that conception.
There is, however, another important possibility. One could
conceivably bite the bullet and abandon the notion that the psychology
of the employer is of the essence in our legal conception of
discrimination. In other words, one might argue that what I am calling an
instability—the conflation, invited by the causal conception, of
differential treatment caused by an employer’s unconscious bias with
differential treatment caused by an employer’s reliance on facts in turn
caused by societal racial inequality—actually points the way to a more
adequate conception of discrimination. According to this “bullet-biting”
view, we should accept that there truly is no meaningful difference
between the “Work Experience” and Work Experience II hypotheticals.
The phenomenon of implicit bias is nothing more than the embodiment
in individual actors of the circumstances of inequality and patterns of
racial disadvantage that continue to beset our society and our
126
Implicit bias may operate through our individual
workplaces.
psychologies, but it is a consequence and reflection of our social

126. See Lawrence, supra note 121, at 322–23. For a similar argument, see Justin D. Levinson,
Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 Duke L.J. 345, 417–
20 (2007).
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127

history:
It “reflects the way people unknowingly carry society’s
128
weaknesses with them at all times.”
This seems to me a deeply plausible view. If we accept it, then the
argument in favor of liability for unconscious discrimination truly is an
argument for moving our conception of discrimination away from the
paradigm of individual human action and more toward a conception that
defines it as something like the expression of our persistent structures of
129
social inequality. Discrimination on this broader picture is not always
the act of an individual agent who defies principles of equal treatment,
but can also be the manifestation, through individual action, of past and
130
persistent social injustice and inequality. On this understanding of what
discriminatory action is, holding employers liable for discrimination—
both conscious and unconscious—must be understood not as a practice
of enforcing norms of individual responsibility, but about effecting social
change and reform.

Conclusion
I set out in this Article to explore what might be called a naïve
question about the legal significance of unconscious bias: Should
employment discrimination law allow for the imposition of liability based
on proof of such bias? To reach the merits of this question, I devised a
thought experiment in which I hypothesized a set of facts (the “Work
Experience” case) in an employment context and asked whether the
employer should be held liable for discrimination if we could prove that
her action was influenced by the operation of implicit bias, even if she
genuinely believed that she was acting only on the basis of adequate
reasons.
I have explained that the argument in favor of holding the employer
liable in the “Work Experience” case on the basis of her implicit racial
bias implies a shift in the operative model of discrimination from a
justificatory conception (in which discrimination is centrally defined by a
certain kind of inadequacy in an agent’s putative rationale in acting) to a
causal conception (in which discrimination is defined by the presence of
a certain kind of causal influence in an action’s psychological etiology).
Our misgivings about liability for unconscious discrimination can be
explained, I have argued, by its dependence on the causal conception.

127. See Levinson, supra note 126, at 417–20.
128. Id. at 420.
129. Cf. Lawrence, supra note 121, at 322–23 (arguing that an individual’s racism is intertwined
with society’s belief system).
130. Larry Alexander makes a similar observation in discussing the difficulties of drawing a
meaningful moral distinction between actions based on conscious bias, actions based on unconscious
bias, and actions based on preferences that are facially neutral but are in fact “tainted” by a causal
connection to historically discriminatory social structures. See Alexander, supra note 33, at 177–81.
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Entertaining the normative plausibility of such liability calls forth the
familiar philosophical tension between viewing an action as the
determined consequence of antecedent causal conditions that are not
responsive to the agent’s own judgments, and at the same time holding
the agent responsible for that action.
I have suggested that the causal conception of discrimination is
susceptible to some worries—one having to do with diminishing the
moral seriousness of the charge of discrimination, and the other with a
potential instability that might undermine the distinction between
individual and “societal” discrimination. What we ought to conclude
from these worries is not entirely clear to me. It does seem, though, that
if the model of implicit bias really is, as many commentators have
131
argued, the paradigm of discrimination that will be most relevant to the
workplace in coming years, then perhaps it is not so naïve after all to ask
whether the law should adjust accordingly. If this means changing our
understanding of discrimination from an agent-centered, moralistic
conception to a predominantly psychosocial, diagnostic one, then
perhaps our wisest response might be to bite the necessary bullets and
adopt that latter conception. If unconscious discrimination really is best
characterized as akin to passing on an infectious disease, then maybe the
law should approach the problem of such discrimination not in the
traditional manner of assigning individual responsibility and blame, but
132
much more in the manner of addressing an issue of public health.

131. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 21, at 3–16; Jolls, supra note 71, at 72–73; Krieger, supra note 2, at
1164.
132. See Lawrence, supra note 121, at 329.
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